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Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural
Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution
Russell Dean Covey*
INTRODUCTION
Law’s interplay with popular culture is fascinatingly
multifaceted, and nowhere has the complexity of the relationship
played out more fully than with the media’s treatment of
Miranda v. Arizona.1 Not only did television make the Miranda
warnings famous,2 its adoption of Miranda as an icon of criminal
procedure may be the main reason Miranda is good law today.
At least, one can extract that claim from the Court’s decision in
Dickerson v. United States.3
The Dickerson Court declined the opportunity to overrule
Miranda and return interrogation law to its pre-Miranda status,
it said, largely because “Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture.”4 Pop culture thus saved
Miranda. But why? What, if any, link is there between the
procedures that constitute “routine police practice” and the fact
that Miranda has become a part of the national culture?
To the extent that there is a link at all, I suspect it is quite
attenuated. Delivery of Miranda warnings to a suspect prior to
custodial interrogation is only one of many routine police
practices, most of which—say, the search-incident-to-arrest
* Associate Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; M.A.,
Princeton University; A.B., Amherst College.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights In Historical Context: In Defense Of
Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 998 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2004)) (noting that most Americans “can recite the Miranda warning from memory
because they have heard it so often on television”).
3 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). The issue presented to the
Court in Dickerson was the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a provision of the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control Act which purported to replace Miranda with an approach to
assessing the admissibility of statements obtained in custodial interrogation that directed
courts to consider several factors, viewed in the “totality of the circumstances,” in
assessing whether a statement was “voluntary” and thus admissible under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 431–32.
4 Id. at 443.
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rules—never became national icons.
And what does
embeddedness in pop culture have to do with the
constitutionality of a warning requirement? On the surface at
least, not much. In my view, the Dickerson Court’s claim is best
read as stating not one but two distinct justifications for
upholding Miranda. One claim is that Miranda should be
preserved because the Miranda warnings have become a useful
part of routine police practice.5 A second is that the Miranda
warnings should not be dispensed with because of the collateral
damage that would result from uprooting such an embedded
cultural icon.
This article comments on the second of those two claims. It
explores the depiction of interrogation in film and television from
the 1940s to the present, and contrasts that imagery with the
Supreme Court’s interrogation jurisprudence over the same time
frame.6 Although my treatment of the subject is necessarily only
fragmentary (a comprehensive review of either topic would fill
many volumes), this article hazards a few tentative hypotheses.
First, a review of the treatment of interrogation in both
domains during this period strongly suggests that law and
popular culture are not autonomous regions of thought or distinct
and isolated disciplines,7 but rather that law and culture are in
deep dialogue. On the one hand, as Professors Sarat and Kearns
have noted, law is “constitutive of culture” in the sense that its
“concepts and commands” have a way of penetrating the cultural

5 That the Miranda warnings have been widely accepted as useful to prosecutors
and the police is indicated by the fact that the United States in Dickerson agreed with the
defendant that the Miranda warnings should not be overturned. The opposing position
was argued by an amicus appointed by the Court. See Timothy P. O’Neill, Why Miranda
Does Not Prevent Confessions: Some Lessons from Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and Oprah
Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 865 (2001) (noting that “the federal government in
Dickerson was happy to accept Miranda. Prosecutors have grown to like the fact that
following Miranda’s formalistic rules almost invariably leads to admission of the
confession. Moreover, the vast majority of suspects do not choose to invoke Miranda’s
protections anyway”).
6 As discussed below, part of the story concerns the triangular relationship
<suspect—detective—law> whereby at different times the three have different
relationships. At the risk of gross overgeneralization, in the noir period, suspect and
detective were relatively equally matched, and the law was primarily depicted as a
brooding omnipresence. During the Miranda era, the (good) law was infused with a more
activist role as a shield for the (good) suspect against the (bad) police detective. That
picture was reversed in the post-Miranda period, paradigmatically illustrated in Dirty
Harry, where the (good) police detective actively opposes the (bad) suspect and the (bad)
law. More recently, in cop shows like NYPD Blue and Homicide, the cycle has come full
circle with a return to the depiction of “good/bad” cops squaring off against “good/bad”
criminals under a “good/bad” law.
7 See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW &
LITERATURE 4 (2000) (noting that “[j]udges, lawyers, and legal scholars . . . have tended to
treat the procedures and the language of the law as if they were fully hermetic”).
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consciousness almost imperceptibly.8 At the same time, “[l]egal
meanings are not invented and communicated in a unidirectional
process.”9 Law’s “internal definitions of some of its terms of art”
cannot be reliably understood without reference to popular
meanings and ordinary language.10 Both popular culture and
law draw from, and add to, a common set of iconographic images
that represent and describe the world, thereby creating
something of a collage of interrogation imagery that might be
studied through a “semiotics” of law and order—that is, an
attempt to construct meaning by analyzing the contexts and
mutual relationships in which the concepts of law and order are
embedded.11 Because of this dialogic relationship, not only can
the history of law be illuminated by reference to pop culture (and
vice versa), but the constraints and demands of form and
convention that each genre imposes in its own respective sphere
necessarily influence and transform its counterpart.
Second, the history of Miranda’s iconization, duly noted by
the Court in Dickerson, aptly illustrates this semiotics. I thus
attempt to show that the changing depiction of Miranda on film
and television intersects revealingly with the successive Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts’ treatment of interrogation law
generally, and Miranda law in particular.
The origins of the story, however, predate Miranda. The
“interrogation moment” has always been a central component of
the popular image of law and order, from the single-minded effort
of Porfiry Petrovich to secure Raskolnikov’s confession in
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment,12 to the weekly episodes of
NYPD Blue in which Detectives Bobby Simone and Andy
Sipowicz play good cop/bad cop, using a variety of lawful and
unlawful tactics in the “interview room” to induce suspects to
confess guilt.13 Miranda’s story must be understood as a
continuation of an older plotline concerning popular culture’s use
of confession as a narrative device and its exploitation of police
8

1998).

See LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 7 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,

Id. at 8.
BROOKS, supra note 7, at 4. See also LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra
note 8, at 4–5.
11 For one take on the meaning of the phrase “legal semiotics,” see Jeremy Paul, The
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1787–88 (1991) (identifying a central
tenet of semiology as providing that “signs [like words or legal arguments] take their
meaning from their mutual relationships in a system of signification” (quoting J.M.
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1121
(1990))).
12 See William Burnham, The Legal Context and Contributions of Dostoevsky’s Crime
and Punishment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2002).
13 Susan Bandes & Jack Beermann, Lawyering Up, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 5, at 7 (1998)
(discussing interrogation tactics portrayed on NYPD Blue).
9
10
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interrogation as the vehicle that brings about these confessions.
Confession’s narrative convenience collides awkwardly with
Miranda’s function as a legal solution to a problem dogging the
Court at least since Brown v. Mississippi14: how to sort out the
respective roles of police, trial courts, and appellate courts in
setting the parameters of interrogation, in a way that ensures
that confessions satisfy whatever qualitative criteria are
necessary—be it reliability, voluntariness, or absence of torture
or overt coercion—without overstepping their competency and
jurisdictional bounds and without undermining effective law
enforcement. Both law and pop culture have struggled to
reconcile these competing demands.
Pop culture’s confessional needs are not dissimilar to law’s,
but neither are they identical. Like all effective dramatic
narratives, crime dramas must tell their stories within the short
time their formats permit. Parsimony therefore is extremely
important. At the same time, effective dramatic narrative
requires enough of a sense of verisimilitude to permit the viewer
to suspend disbelief for the duration of the drama.15 The device
of the confession serves the needs of parsimony well; it is the
primary vehicle for narrative closure. (As will be discussed later,
it is with respect to verisimilitude that confession as a plot device
creates problems.) Few and far between are the crime and cop
shows that do not end with the criminal’s confession. The
indispensability of the confession is evidenced by the fact that
even in a contemporary crime show like CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation, which depicts the crime-solving activities of
forensic crime investigators whose job is to analyze and piece
together physical evidence left at crime scenes, virtually every
episode concludes with an interrogation (a highly unrealistic bit
of role confusion) and confession from the “real” criminal.16
The screenwriter’s dramatic reliance on confessions,
regardless of story structure, is intuitively understandable.
Where the narrative is presented from the viewpoint of the
investigating detective, police officer, or crusading citizen who
must solve a crime, the criminal’s confession provides the
possibility of a definitive resolution of the mystery; it permits
revelation of what “really happened.” At the same time, where
297 U.S. 278, 286–87 (1936).
See Norman Rosenberg, Looking for Law in All the Old Traces: The Movies of
Classical Hollywood, the Law, and the Case(s) of Film Noir, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1448–
50 (2001) (discussing the requirements of realism and effective storytelling, including the
need to reach adequate resolution of narrative tensions necessary to construct the plot).
16 The absurdity of lab technicians conducting interrogations is fairly self-evident.
See Joanne Kimberlin, Forget What You See on ‘CSI,’ THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 3, 2006,
at A1.
14
15
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the narrative is presented from the criminal’s perspective, the
confession permits the character development so essential to
effective narrative; the criminal confesses to demonstrate his
acknowledgement of transgression, to make vengeance for
wrongdoing possible, to create the preconditions for remorse, or
to lay the foundation for just retribution. Dramatic convention
requires that a villain give some verbal or at least inferable
acknowledgement of culpability before the hero is permitted to
plug him with lead.17 Avenging heroes do not kill transgressors
unaware. Not only would an unwarned killing be unmanly, it
would defeat the very idea of retribution for which the avenging
hero stands, because retributive punishment loses its meaning
unless its subject is aware of the reasons for his punishment.18
Confession is equally important where the suspect in a
dramatic narrative is innocent. Indeed, confession is perhaps
even more important in this context, because a suspected
character’s innocence cannot be dispositively confirmed absent an
exonerating explanation. As Peter Brooks writes, “[E]xculpation
depends on articulation.”19 Resolution cannot occur unless the
protagonist confesses the truth or the guilty party confesses to
absolve the innocent. Thus, regardless of whether the story’s
protagonist is criminal or cop, guilty or innocent, narrative rules
require a response to accusation in order to confirm guilt or to
deny it, to justify retribution or defeat it.
Pop culture could hardly live without confession. Nor, as it
turns out, can law. Some of the most interesting contemporary
jury research suggests that juries evaluate evidence through a
narrative lens.20 That is, in reaching verdicts, “jurors impose a
narrative story organization on trial information.”21 As such, the
cognitive strategies jurors rely upon in the courtroom are similar,
if not identical, to those at work in the living room or theater.
Confessions likely perform a narrative function in the courtroom
similar to that in fiction—they parsimoniously and definitively
resolve doubts regarding the veracity of the prosecutor’s story.
The legal system’s overwhelming reliance on guilty pleas to
resolve criminal charges, moreover, further elevates the
17 PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 84 (2001) (explaining that
retributive vengeance requires that before receiving his (or her) just deserts the
wrongdoer “accept that what he (or she) did to someone else was wrong”).
18 See id. The requirement that criminal defendants must be competent at the time
they are executed has been held to be a fundamental attribute of due process. Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986).
19 BROOKS, supra note 7, at 114.
20 See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid
Hastie ed., 1993).
21 Id. at 194 (emphasis omitted).
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importance of confession, since confession serves as a substitute
for objective evidence of guilt. Appellate courts have come to rely
on confessions (in the form of guilty pleas) in order to minimize
post-conviction process. From the point of view of the legal
system, confession (in the interrogation room or the courtroom)
provides the closure necessary to the system’s function and
legitimacy. It thus comes as no surprise that the Court has
announced that law cannot do without confession, proclaiming
that “[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely ‘desirable,’ they
are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”22
But that still leaves the problem of how, consistent with the
demands of verisimilitude and constitutional law, the confession
is to be induced. After all, few confessions in reality are freely
offered.23 Bound up with the drama of confession, then, is the
distinctive role performed by the confessor’s handmaiden: the
interrogator, who in drama as in real life may wear many hats,24
including psychoanalyst, priest, lover, or policeman, or who may
not be a person at all, but rather a diary25 or dictaphone.26
As we will see, Miranda’s story reflects an evolving
understanding of the relationship between police interrogator
and suspect told by successive generations of jurists. But the
Supreme Court was far from the only arbiter of the interrogation
room. Even as the Supreme Court in its role as constitutional
overseer of police evidence-gathering methods focused on the
delicate legal intracacies of interrogation—weighing and
balancing the respective importance of such values as individual
autonomy and the right to be free of coercion against the state’s
interest in solving crimes and securing convictions—purveyors of
popular culture were busily instantiating and appropriating
interrogation and confession for their own distinct purposes.
Their product—the crime films and police shows that have served
as a mainstay of pop culture since Hollywood’s birth—
simultaneously borrows from authoritative sources of law (such
as Supreme Court opinions), mirrors popular assumptions about
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (citation omitted).
If law demanded voluntary confessions in the purest sense of the term, the only
confessions the police could accept would be those in which a person of his own volition
“enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime”—as Miranda itself
almost but not quite suggested—the screenwriter (and the typical beat-cop) would be in
difficult straits. 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (quoting People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 354
(1965)).
24 See BROOKS, supra note 7, at 35–42.
25 Nikolai Gogol, Diary of a Madman, in THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SHORT STORY: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 53 (James E. Miller, Jr. & Bernice Slote eds., 1964).
26 See BILLY WILDER, DOUBLE INDEMNITY 10 (2000). The movie Double Indemnity is
discussed infra.
22
23
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what law is, and shapes public attitudes toward what law should
be. Pop culture’s depiction of interrogation reflects and provides
a record of evolving legal norms and changing public expectations
not only about law and the legal process, but about the nature of
the human condition. The next part of this article attempts to
illustrate this dynamic by juxtaposing images of interrogation in
film and in Supreme Court decisions during the era of film noir.27
I. INTERROGATION IN THE PRE-MIRANDA ERA
The contest between interrogator and suspect featured
centrally in the film noir crime dramas of the 1940s and 1950s.28
Indeed, many films noir used the interrogation/confession device
as their basic narrative framework.29 In this part, I consider two
brief fragments from a pair of the classic films noir, both released
in 1944. The first fragment is a bit of dialogue from Double
Indemnity, a film which follows the ill-fated scheme of insurance
salesman Walter Neff and housewife Phyllis Dietrichson to
murder Dietrichson’s husband, which is told in the form of Neff’s
dying confession. Shortly after Neff (Fred MacMurray) has
commenced an affair with Dietrichson (Barbara Stanwyck),
Dietrichson divulges thoughts of murdering her rich and
inattentive husband. Neff, with a dawning realization that her
interest in him is related to her desire to take out and collect on a
secret insurance policy on her husband’s life, warns that such a
plot would be quickly detected by his company’s claims
investigator. Says Neff, “[A] set-up like that would be just like a
slice of rare roast beef. In three minutes he’d know it wasn’t an
accident. In ten minutes you’d be sitting under the hot lights. In
half an hour you’d be signing your name to a confession.”30
27 The tactic used here is to focus more on fragmentary imagery, and less on the
overarching moral lessons intended by the creators of popular culture, even if such
overarching lessons could be clearly identified. See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 1449–53
(noting that film medium tends towards open-texturedness rather than closed, tight
meanings in order to resonate with wider audiences, and thereby increase box-office
appeal and profit).
28 Norman Rosenberg defines film noir as “a group of motion pictures released
during the 1940s and 1950s that foreground images of ‘things legal.’” See Rosenberg,
supra note 15, at 1446.
29 Both Mildred Pierce (Warner Brothers 1945) and Double Indemnity (Paramount
Pictures 1944) were told in the form of confessions given by their ill-fated protagonists.
The Greatest Films, Mildred Pierce (1945), http://www.filmsite.org/mild.html; The
Greatest Films, Double Indemnity (1944), http://www.filmsite.org/doub.html. In Mildred
Pierce, Mildred’s confession was made to the police in the course of police-station
questioning. In Double Indemnity, Walter Neff narrates his confession to a Dictaphone in
his insurance office while he sits bleeding from a gunshot wound.
30 See Billy Wilder & Raymond Chandler, Double Indemnity (screenplay), available
at http://www.weeklyscript.com/Double%20Indemnity.txt (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
The full dialogue is as follows:
PHYLLIS: The other night we drove home from a party. He was drunk
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The second fragment to consider is a climactic scene
occurring near the end of another 1944 film, Laura.31 Laura
Hunt (Gene Tierney) has been arrested for the murder of Diane
Redfern, and Detective Mark McPherson (Dana Andrews) has
brought Laura to the police station for questioning. As soon as
McPherson sits down, he flips on two bright interrogation lights
directed in Laura’s face:
McPherson
“All right, let’s have it.”
Laura
“What are you trying to do, force a confession out of me?”
McPherson
“You’ve been holding out and I want to know why. It’ll be easier
for you if you tell the truth.”
Laura
“What difference does it make what I say. You’ve made up your
mind, I’m guilty.”
McPherson
“Are you?”
Laura
“Don’t tell me you have any doubts, since you. . . [dropping her
head and shielding her eyes] Oh, I can’t, please, do I have to have
those lights in my face?”
[McPherson turns off the lights.]
“Thanks. [pause] No, I didn’t kill Diane Redfern . . .”32

What do these two filmic fragments tell us about the popular
conception of interrogation? Most obviously, their adoption of the
“hot lights” in the interrogation room as a metaphor for police
questioning suggests a prevalent assumption that moderate
pressure in the interrogation room was standard, the norm
rather than the exception. In Laura, McPherson turns on the
lights without hesitation or pause. In Double Indemnity, when
again. When we got into the garage he just sat there with his head on the
steering wheel and the motor still running. And I thought what it would be like
if I didn’t switch it off, just closed the garage door and left him there.
NEFF: I’ll tell you what it would be like, if you had that accident policy,
and tried to pull a monoxide job. We have a guy in our office named Keyes.
For him a set-up like that would be just like a slice of rare roast beef. In three
minutes he’d know it wasn’t an accident. In ten minutes you’d be sitting under
the hot lights. In half an hour you’d be signing your name to a confession.
31 LAURA (Twentieth Century Fox 1944).
32 Id.
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Neff wishes to dissuade Phyllis from killing, he invokes the lights
as a metaphor for police questioning. The lights are synonymous
with interrogation itself.
In addition to reflecting a basic popular comfort with police
pressure tactics in the interrogation room, several additional
messages can be gleaned from the interrogation imagery in these
pre-Miranda films. First, Neff’s warning to Phyllis suggests a
popular presupposition that when criminal suspicions point to a
particular suspect, the suspect will be called to answer questions.
Second, both fragments underscore the belief, or at least the
pretense, that police pressure will induce revelation of the truth.
These messages are of course fully consistent with the
“dogmatic”33 moral lesson of the films of the period: crime
(although titillating) doesn’t pay. Criminality inevitably leads to
confession, which in turn leads to retribution, either in the form
of punishment or, more typically, death—the fate that befalls
Dietrichson and Neff in Double Indemnity, and Waldo Lydecker,
the real killer in Laura. (Death, for narrative effect, is much
neater than legal process.)
If the “hot lights” metaphor demonstrates the popular
expectation that suspects will be questioned and that police will
apply pressure to get suspects to talk, the juxtaposition of strong
pressure tactics and delicate (or apparently delicate) suspects
such as Laura Hunt and Phyllis Dietrichson suggests a further
expectation that police interrogational pressure will be
moderated in proportion to the strength of the suspect’s capacity
to withstand it. After all, very little pressure is necessary to
overcome Laura’s capacity—when she shows weakness,
McPherson turns off the lights, and Laura talks.34
As the words “film noir” suggest, the prevalence of darkness

33 Dogmatic, in the sense of reflecting the ordained beliefs authorized and approved
by authority. All films of this era were required to comply with the Production Code,
which (among other things) dictated that “the sympathy of the audience should never be
thrown to the side of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin,” and that “[l]aw, natural or human,
shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created for its violation.” MOTION PICTURE
PRODUCTION CODE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1, 3 (1930), reprinted in LEONARD J. LEFF &
JEROLD L. SIMMONS, THE DAME IN THE KIMONO: HOLLYWOOD, CENSORSHIP, AND THE
PRODUCTION CODE app., at 286–87 (2d ed. 2001).
34 Laura’s encounter further illustrates an image of police interrogation at once
familiar and jarring: familiar because audiences are accustomed to the idea that criminals
will be subjected to pressure tactics; jarring because McPherson’s treatment of the
beautiful Laura as a typical criminal upsets our preconceived notions of who should be
subjected to them. The jarring quality of Laura’s interrogation does not represent a
condemnation of police pressure tactics, however, nor is the propriety of interrogation
room pressure diminished by the fact that Laura’s is an exculpatory confession. The
confession is essential to the dissipation of the cloud of suspicion surrounding Laura and
allows McPherson to identify the real killer and save Laura’s life.
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to “convey a bleak or cynical mood”35 is an essential feature of the
genre, and the play of light and dark not only serves an
important aesthetic function but also works as an important
narrative device. In a literary sense, the “hot lights” symbolize
the glare of inquisition, a glare that unearths the “subterranean
Questioning under the hot lights
life of guilty secrets.”36
represents the literal and figurative process by which guilty
secrets and wicked motives are dredged from the recesses of the
criminal mind and exposed to the light of moral judgment and,
ultimately, legal retribution.
The harsh glare of the
interrogation lights starkly contrasts with the shadowy
underworlds in which the characters live.
An emerging
fascination with Freud also was manifested in the interrogation
moment, which did double duty as a metaphor for the struggle
between the unconscious (which seeks to remain hidden) and the
psychoanalytic impulse to expose it to light.37
If police interrogation was portrayed as a useful, and
perhaps essential, instrumentality of truth, interrogation was a
soldier in the larger mission to expose the flawed humanity of the
interrogated. The classic film noir criminals—Walter Neff and
Phyllis Dietrichson in Double Indemnity, or even Waldo Lydecker
(Clifton Webb) in Laura—were not cardboard cutouts but
complex, flawed human beings. Part of film noir’s fascination
stems from its willingness to trade in shades of gray, to explore
the murky complexities of human motive that move men and
women to do evil. Criminality in film noir was variously
portrayed as a vice or a weakness, stemming in some cases from
the all-too-human desire for love, money, or drink, and in others,
to moral or mental sickness, but almost always as the product of
some recognizable human frailty.38 Film noir thus acknowledged
the thin line separating ordinary men and women from
criminals.
How does law’s depiction of interrogation compare? Perhaps
not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s narrative tactics in its pre35 TIMOTHY O. LENZ, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM & TELEVISION CRIME
STORIES 54 (2003).
36 BROOKS, supra note 7, at 116.
37 See LEFF & SIMMONS, supra note 33, at 131 (noting that many Hollywood
scriptwriters, themselves undergoing psychoanalysis, increasingly incorporated Freudian
themes into their film scripts in the 1940s). As Brooks notes, like the interrogation room,
the “Church’s carefully crafted confessional and the psychoanalyst’s couch are both places
designed for the telling of intimate, dark secrets.” BROOKS, supra note 7, at 141.
38 As such, the viewer has a complex emotional relationship with the main
characters—empathizing with them at the same time that it becomes plain that they
cannot escape retribution and punishment for their bad acts. In this way, film noir
constructs criminal justice as the unfolding of tragedy—the characters’ fatal flaws
inevitably and inexorably causing their downfall.
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Miranda involuntary confessions cases bear a striking
resemblance to the interrogation-room dynamic depicted in film
noir.
Walter Neff’s description of interrogation in Double
Indemnity,39 for instance, echoes the interrogation of Major
Raymond Lisenba described by the Court in Lisenba v.
California,40 a case involving a defendant who—in classic film
noir fashion—murdered his wife in order to collect life insurance
on a “double indemnity” clause of the policy. Rejecting Lisenba’s
claim that his confession was involuntary, the Court explained
that although Lisenba was confined and questioned without
break by relays of police officers over a period of thirty-six hours,
slapped (or worse), and deprived of sleep and food, the
interrogation did not violate due process because, like the
protypical film noir villain, Lisenba allegedly remained calm and
cool throughout. In the Court’s words, Lisenba
exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so
lost his freedom of action that the statements were not his but were
the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer.41

The Court made no mention of interrogation lights in its opinion,
but it registered no qualms over the pressure tactics that were
admittedly used to interrogate Lisenba. Like Double Indemnity
and Laura, the Court implicitly assumed that some amount of
police pressure was permitted and even expected.
The “hot lights” were discussed at some length in Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, however, where the Court reversed a defendant’s
murder conviction based on a finding that the defendant’s
confession, elicited after thirty-eight hours of non-stop
questioning, was involuntary.42 The Court narrated the events
leading up to Ashcraft’s confession:
[E]arly in the evening of Saturday, June 14, the officers came to
Ashcraft’s home and ‘took him into custody.’ In the words of the
Tennessee Supreme Court, ‘They took him to an office or room on the
northwest corner of the fifth floor of the Shelby County jail. This
office is equipped with all sorts of crime and detective devices such as
a fingerprint outfit, cameras, high-powered lights, and such other
devices as might be found in a homicide investigating office. . . . It

39 Double Indemnity was adapted from a novel by James M. Cain, which in turn was
based on a real murder that made headlines in 1927. The constant recycling of material
from one genre to the next underscores the fluidity and seamlessness of the legal and
cultural worlds. See IMDb.com, Double Indemnity (1944), http://imdb.com/title/tt0036775/
(last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
40 314 U.S. 219, 223 (1941).
41 Id. at 241.
42 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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appears that the officers placed Ashcraft at a table in this room on the
fifth floor of the county jail with a light over his head and began to
quiz him. They questioned him in relays until the following Monday
morning, June 16, 1941, around nine-thirty or ten o’clock. It appears
that Ashcraft from Saturday evening at seven o’clock until Monday
morning at approximately nine-thirty never left this homicide room on
the fifth floor.43

Ashcraft’s interrogation followed the standard noir script in
every detail. The interrogation room, equipped with a variety of
criminal detection devices and interrogation lights, could have
been lifted directly from a Hollywood set. As in Lisenba, police
officers defended the extended interrogation with the assertion
that after thirty-eight hours of questioning, Ashcraft remained
“‘cool,’ ‘calm,’ ‘collected,’ ‘normal.’”44 But here the Court diverged
from the script. Ashcraft’s confession was not deemed, as it so
easily might have been, the inevitable triumph of truth over
criminal cunning.
Instead, the Court critically noted the
documented evidence of systematic police misconduct in
interrogation, including the use of the “hot lights” to induce
confessions,45 and threw out Ashcraft’s conviction on grounds
that the thirty-eight hour interrogation was “so inherently
coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the
possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom
[the state’s] full coercive force is brought to bear.”46
Ashcraft, decided in the same year that Double Indemnity
and Laura were released, provided an alternative interrogation
narrative, and one decidedly more liberal than pop culture’s.
Certainly, the Court’s condemnation of high-pressure police
questioning diverged from the hard-nosed assumptions about
police questioning embedded in films like Double Indemnity and
Laura.
This is not to say that the Court was unanimous in its
condemnation of the popular conception of police interrogation.
Justice Jackson cited Lisenba in cautioning that he, at least, was
“not ready to say that the pressure to disclose crime, involved in
decent detention and lengthy examination,” even if “inherently
coercive,” need be “denied to a State by the Constitution, where
Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
Id. at 151.
The Wickersham Commission’s report on police third-degree practices had found
that “[p]owerful lights turned full on the prisoner’s face, or switched on and off have been
found effective” by police for inducing defendants to confess. Id. at 150 n.6 (quoting
Report of Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law made to the Section of Criminal Law
and Criminology of the American Bar Association, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 575, 579–80
(1930)).
46 Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 154 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 556, 562–
63 (1897)).
43
44
45
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they are not proved to have passed the individual’s ability to
resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.”47 Nonetheless,
the Court’s basic direction appears to have been set. Although,
over the course of the following two decades, the Court grew
increasingly skeptical of high-pressure police interrogation, the
dominant paradigm continued to be that of the clash of wills
between suspect and interrogator, where the question was
whether the pressure exerted on the suspect was proportional to
her mental, physical, and emotional resources.48 The use of belts,
whips, and extended relay questioning was clearly improper, but
the exploitation of inadequately explained inconsistencies fell
safely within fair territory. The suspect’s implicit obligation to
produce an adequate and consistent explanation thus remained a
central fact of police interrogation.
Ultimately, consideration of interrogation imagery in film
and law during this era gives rise to a complex picture. On one
hand, interrogation in the movies and in Supreme Court opinions
share basic preconceptions. Interrogation in both mediums
represented a climactic moment in the battle between good and
evil, truth and crime, and pressure tactics—moderated so that
the will of the suspect was not overborne—were recognized as a
valuable tool to uncover wrongdoing. Sometimes the police
overreached, but sometimes substantial pressure was both
necessary and appropriate to expose chinks in the “almost
perfect” story. At the same time, where Hollywood sought to
emphasize the drama of the contest of wills, the Court began the
project of crafting rules to limit the degree of pressure that
interrogators might bring to bear on suspects. The attack on the
“hot lights” had begun. To the extent that they lagged in
reconceptualizing the interrogation-room narrative, it appears
that Hollywood writers were taking their cues from the material
around them, and not the other way around.49 Led by Justices
Id. at 170 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). Justice Frankfurter
explained that
a confession made by a person in custody is not always the result of an
overborne will. The police may be midwife to a declaration naturally born of
remorse, or relief, or desperation, or calculation. If that is so, if the ‘suction
process’ has not been at the prisoner and drained his capacity for freedom of
choice, does not the awful responsibility of the police for maintaining the
peaceful order of society justify the means which they have employed?
Id. at 576.
49 At least during this period, however, Hollywood’s picture of interrogation lagged
behind the progressive efforts of the Court to bring due process principles to bear on
confessions. The 1944 films Laura and Double Indemnity are more akin in their
iconography with the 1941 Lisenba case than they were with the 1944 Ashcraft decision
which was already tending in the direction of Miranda. Id. at 154 (Justice Black’s
opinion, for example, suggests that interrogation standards should be judged by
47
48
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Black and Frankfurter, the Court’s stepped-up assault on
coercive interrogation tactics for the time being would put the
Court further out in front of pop culture in the coming decades.
II. PERRY MASON, MIRANDA, AND INTERROGATION ON THE
WITNESS STAND
With Brown v. Board of Education50 on the horizon and an
increasing interest in the expansion of civil rights, both law and
culture were set for major changes at the mid-century. By the
time Miranda was decided, the effects of the civil rights
movement and the ferment of the 1960s had wrought deep
changes in popular culture, including a deep erosion in trust and
sympathy for the police.
This distrust was reflected in Hollywood’s choice of pop
heroes. Although popular in the 1950s, both the crime film and
the cop show had almost disappeared in the early 1960s.51 To the
extent police were portrayed at all in the popular culture of the
decade, they tended to be depicted not as crime-fighting heroes
but rather as “corrupt or inept.”52 Law, however, did not lose its
attraction as a subject of pop culture. Although the police drama
may have lost its luster, the stock of lawyers rose to
unprecedented heights.
The decade preceding Miranda
witnessed a brief and unparalleled reign of the lawyer drama.53
Three of the most famous trial films ever made, Anatomy of a
Murder (1959), 12 Angry Men (1957), and To Kill a Mockingbird
(1967)54 debuted during this period, as did the most famous trial
lawyer never to grace an actual courtroom: Perry Mason.55
comparison to the standards of the open courtroom: “It is inconceivable that any court of
justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to the public, would permit
prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous crossexamination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a ‘voluntary’
confession.”).
50 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 54 (stating that “crime film noir lasted until around
1955 when the public lost some of its interest in crime stories” in lieu of newfound interest
in civil rights and the Cold War).
52 Bandes & Beermann, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that there was “a brief period in
the late 1960s and early 1970s in which police (along with other government officials)
were often portrayed as corrupt or inept”).
53 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 54.
54 Id. at 46 (noting that these films continue to be “used in classrooms to teach civics
lessons about law and politics”).
55 Mason made his television debut in 1957. See Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets
Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 229, 249 (1987). One of the dominant themes of Perry Mason, and indeed many of
the major television series of the 1960s, was the ineptness of the police who, week after
week, managed to arrest the wrong suspect only so Mason could expose the mistake in
court.
Other shows similarly “mocked the wayward ways of the crime-fighting
establishment and even the law itself.” Id. at 250. At the same time, several shows in the

761-788 COVEY.DOC

9/18/2007 7:03:21 AM

2007] Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution

775

Just as the Supreme Court’s confession cases of the 1940s
conceptualized interrogation in a manner paralleling the pop
culture imagery of the era—as a battle of wits and wills between
police officers and criminal suspects—Chief Justice Warren’s
opinion in Miranda, like the Court’s opinions in Gideon v.
Wainwright,56 Massiah v. United States,57 Escobedo v. Illinois,58
and Duncan v. Louisiana,59 reflected an approach to
constitutional criminal procedure that elevated the role of
lawyers above that of the police.60 It is not farfetched to say, as
some indeed have said, that the Warren Court’s major milestones
were in some sense a product of Perry Mason, or at least a
reflection of the assumptions about the roles of lawyers, law,
courts, prosecutors, and police common to pop cultural depictions
of the era.61
In the Perry Mason view of the world, the defense lawyer
rather than the police detective plays the principal role of
guardian of justice. Week after week on television, Perry Mason
induced criminals to confess, not in the interrogation room under
the hot lights, but instead in the open courtroom, in response to
irrefutable evidence or withering cross-examination and with the
whole community as witness.62 In the era of the lawyer drama,
the law was certainly not depicted as perfect, as illustrated by
the repeated false accusations of Mason’s clients or the unjust
conviction of Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird. But the
solution to an imperfect law offered in the Perry Mason era was
not the abandonment of law, but more and better law.63
wake of Perry Mason’s success featured prosecutors as outright villains and defense
lawyers as heroes. Id. at 254 (discussing the television shows The Defenders, Cain’s
Hundred, and Arrest and Trial). Indeed, the period from 1960 to 1968 featured a
remarkably small number of traditional crime and cops-and-robbers dramas.
56 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel is a fundamental right incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause).
57 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
58 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
59 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by jury is a fundamental
right incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause).
60 See, e.g., Prime Time Law: Fictional Television as Legal Narrative, N.J. LAW., Oct.
1998, at 34 (reviewing PRIME TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION AS LEGAL NARRATIVE
(Robert Jarvis & Paul Joseph eds., 1998) (noting that “Perry Mason’s success was . . . a
function of what the public wanted to believe about its lawyers in that time”).
61 See Stark, supra note 55, at 230 (arguing that “it would be . . . foolish to pretend
that [Perry Mason] played no role at all” in the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
decisions).
62 See id. at 249 (describing the “formulaic” structure of Perry Mason, in which every
episode concluded with Mason putting on a string of witnesses that “forced the real
culprit to confess in the courtroom”).
63 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 70 (noting that the message of To Kill a Mockingbird
is “that law needs to be strengthened as an instrument of justice,” a message that is
“consistent with the liberal model of justice”).
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The need for more and better law is precisely what Miranda
sought to deliver. But if Miranda’s spin on interrogation was not
truly original,64 its true genius, and perhaps what made it so
controversial, was its wholesale inversion of the semiotics of
interrogation. Hollywood writers “worth their salt” have always
known that credible drama demands congruence between plot
and character, as have sophisticated judges and lawyers. In
Miranda, Warren sought to bolster the credence of the Court’s
attempt to reshape interrogation law by presenting the story of
interrogation from the perspective of the suspect rather than the
police. In this respect, he followed the teaching of Peter Fonda’s
character in 12 Angry Men, in which Fonda explains that he does
not share his fellow jurors’ initial inclination to convict the
defendant because he “chose to see the case from the perspective
of the defendant rather than the prosecution.”65 By narrating the
process of interrogation by recounting the tricks described in
police interrogation manuals, Miranda deftly inverted the
traditional roles of criminal and cop. By emphasizing the ploys
used by interrogators to induce suspects to confess, Warren cast
the police as the bad guys and suspects not as “criminals” but
rather isolated, fearful, and helpless victims.66
Not only did Miranda shift perspective on familiar character
roles, it also inverted traditional metaphors of light and darkness
in the criminal law iconography. If in film noir the hot lights
were a metaphor for the act of probing the dark recesses of the
criminal mind—inevitably exposing the criminal’s secrets to
view—in Miranda, interrogation itself became a kind of virtually
“criminal” secret, and the interrogation room a place where
“police violence and the ‘third degree’ flourished.”67 Occurring
unrecorded, in private, and thus eluding our scope of
64 Miranda, of course, was not the first Supreme Court case to castigate police
interrogation or to contrast it unfavorably with public, open-court proceedings. Beginning
with Justice Black’s decision in Ashcraft, the Court grew increasingly critical of highpressure police interrogation tactics that diverged from courtroom standards. Justice
Frankfurter, for instance, wrote in Watts v. Indiana that “[t]o turn the detention of an
accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be extorted in
open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as to offend
the procedural standards of due process.” 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
65 LENZ, supra note 35, at 64.
66 George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
“Embedded” In Our National Culture?, in 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 217 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2002) (“Somehow, suspects gained a measure of the Court’s sympathy between Lisenba
and Miranda. Somehow, the police had become authoritarian rather than simply
overzealous.”); Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1447, 1472
(1985) (noting that although previous Supreme Court cases viewed the arrestee “as a
hardy suspect—unwilling to confess and able to resist police questioning for hours
without having his will overborne,” Miranda portrayed arrestees as easily manipulatable
persons).
67 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
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understanding, the interrogation room became the procedural
equivalent of the Freudian unconscious—calling forth for a
different sort of confession.68 Miranda’s solution was to expose
interrogation’s own dark secrets to public scrutiny, and in so
doing to “interrogate” interrogation itself.69
Ultimately, this narrative move may not have been possible
without the cover provided by the pop culture tropes of the
period. The interplay between the Supreme Court’s interrogation
jurisprudence and popular culture’s changing depiction of the
role of lawyers, police and suspects is hard to pin down. It may
be, however, that just as the creators of Perry Mason needed
Justices Black and Frankfurter to lay the groundwork that would
make Mason a compelling character, Chief Justice Warren
needed Perry Mason to establish the cultural preconditions
necessary for the large-scale transformation of legal culture he so
obviously envisioned.
In any event, Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in
Miranda, which offered as a rejoinder to Warren’s narrative the
assertion that “peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark
moments of the law,”70 suggests that Warren’s semiotic inversion
did not pass wholly unnoticed. As the dissenters pointed out, the
majority opinion reflected not merely a concern with the
circumstances in which some confessions are made, but rather “a
deep-seated distrust of all confessions.”71 To those who accepted
the film noir image of interrogation as a necessary process of
subjecting the suspect to questioning under the “hot lights,” as
did Justice Harlan, Miranda was a wolf in sheep’s clothing.72 It
threatened inevitably to “return a killer, a rapist or other
criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced
68 Id. at 445. Chief Justice Warren imagines what happens during interrogation by
recounting the interrogation tactics detailed in training manuals.
69 At least in a literary sense, the Miranda warnings perform an illuminative
function very different from the interrogation room lights in the classic films noir. Not
only do they educate suspects about their rights, but they also highlight, emphasize, and
focus suspects on those rights. Repetition of the warnings makes it plain to the suspect
that the decision to speak or remain silent is a choice with serious consequences.
Miranda further illuminated the interrogation room chamber by opening its door to
defense counsel. Knowledge of rights and the presence of counsel, the majority clearly
hoped, would allow a fearful defendant to confront his interrogators with the assistance of
law and thereby “to tell his story without fear.” Id. at 466. Either by teaching suspects
their rights, by opening up the interrogation room to the watchful eye of counsel, or by
shifting the locus of the defendant’s questioning from the interrogation room to the
courtroom, Miranda was intended to dissipate the darkness surrounding the
interrogation process, permitting truth to prevail in the courtroom—not in the backroom.
70 Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
72 Like Justice Jackson before him, Justice Harlan accepted that some pressure in
the police interrogation room was essential to the revelation of truth. See id. at 515
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.”73 It also posed
a veiled threat to every Hollywood screenwriter who needed to
find a realistic way to allow his or her characters to confess in
accord with the rules of dramatic narrative.
III. DRAGNET AND MIRANDA’S POPULAR DISSEMINATION
It did not take long for Miranda to travel from slip opinion to
television script. Less than a year after the decision was handed
down, the Miranda warnings became a regular component of
Sergeant Joe Friday’s arrest spiel on the television cop show,
Dragnet. Dragnet, the brainchild of its star and creator Jack
Webb, dramatized the day-to-day police work of the Los Angeles
Police Department (“LAPD”). The show, which first aired on
radio and then ran on television from 1952–1957, and was
revived in 1967 for a second run through 1970, purported to
dramatize real cases drawn from the files of the LAPD. Because
of Webb’s insistence on realism—real LAPD detectives served as
technical advisers to the show74—the new Miranda rules were
duly incorporated into the stories.
Given Dragnet’s tremendous popularity, the Miranda
warnings quickly entered the American consciousness, but to
what end? Friday’s matter-of-fact delivery of the Miranda
warnings undoubtedly suggested that law enforcement officers
were cognizant of their legal duties and scrupulously respectful
of civil rights. Detached, taciturn, devoted to his job and little
else, Friday presented a calm and reassuring portrait of
American law enforcement—an image likely to be comforting to
the public and to television sponsors hoping for an antidote to the
sense of a growing crime threat and perceptions of increasing
disorder on the streets in the late 1960s.75 Miranda’s apparently
easy incorporation into the arrest and police questioning rituals
might also have given Dragnet viewers the impression that
respecting civil rights in general, and Miranda in particular, was
not a difficult ordeal for the police. In addition, and perhaps
most importantly, Dragnet’s treatment of Miranda suggested
that the new procedures were in any event largely symbolic. On
any typical episode, the arrest proceeded as follows: First, Friday
or his partner would recite the Miranda warnings. Second, as
soon as the warnings were given, Friday or his partner would
launch into questioning.
Third, in response, suspects
Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
LENZ, supra note 35, at 86.
See Stark, supra note 55, at 246 (“In broadcasting, . . . there is a key intermediary,
the sponsor, who controls all air time, either directly or indirectly. Dragnet’s portrayal of
the police undoubtedly warmed the hearts of advertisers, who found a pro-establishment
sentiment more in keeping with their conservative political views.”).
73
74
75
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volunteered (often incriminating) answers.76
On Dragnet,
recitation of the warnings did nothing to change the essential
nature of the custodial encounter.
In retrospect, Hollywood’s decision to cast Miranda in this
symbolic and ineffectual manner is not surprising; the dramatic
demand for confession was as great after Miranda as it had been
before. An interesting question, however, is whether Joe Friday’s
taciturn treatment of Miranda had any effect in actual
interrogation rooms. Given that Miranda itself has had little, if
any, effect on the confession rate, perhaps Joe Friday did teach a
lesson to police and their suspects.77 Several studies of police
interrogation after Miranda have documented that police
typically deliver Miranda in essentially the same droning
monotone as Joe Friday, a tactic calculated to minimize the
perception that the stakes have increased. What happens in real
life is thus essentially what happened on Dragnet: the warnings
are read, and the suspect talks.78
Dragnet, of course, depicted the criminal justice system from
the perspective of law enforcement officers.
As such, it
demanded that viewers empathize with cops, not criminals.
Nonetheless, the relatively peaceful, matter-of-fact, just-thefacts-ma’am policing style shown on Dragnet drew from and
suggested a system that was fundamentally at peace with the
law. On Dragnet, the police were competent and disinterested,
they caught the bad guys, and they played “by the book.”
Consistent with the values of Perry Mason and the lawyer
dramas of the earlier part of the decade, Dragnet presented “a
formal, idealistic, civics conception of the criminal justice system.
The police and judges are still on the same side,” and “law, order,
and justice are still closely related.”79

76 See, for example, Dragnet: The Kidnapping (NBC television broadcast Jan. 26,
1967) (or virtually any episode, where suspects make incriminating statements
immediately after receiving the warnings).
77 See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of Miranda: Why We Needed It,
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944546#PaperDownload,
at 23 (observing that “[w]ith one conspicuous exception, there is wide agreement that
Miranda has had a negligible impact on the confession rate”).
78 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 66, at 237 (noting that empirical studies indicate
that “despite the fourfold warnings, suspects frequently waived their Miranda rights and
chose to speak to their interrogators.
Some researchers attributed this largely
unexpected finding to the manner in which detectives delivered the Miranda warnings,
while others attributed it to the failure of suspects to understand the meaning or
significance of their Miranda rights”).
79 LENZ, supra note 35, at 89.
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IV. THE POST-MIRANDA ERA
Joe Friday’s stoic acceptance of Miranda, however, hardly
reflected the storm of controversy that surrounded Miranda in
the “real world.” In Congress and in police departments across
the nation, Miranda was greeted with outrage and hostility.80
Although that hostility was not reflected on Dragnet, during the
1970s, television crime fighters grew increasingly jaded and
dismissive both of Miranda and of the need more generally to
protect the civil rights of criminal suspects.81 Indeed, Jack
Webb’s sequel to the Dragnet series—Adam-12 (which ran from
1968–1975)—regularly featured uniformed LAPD officers
complaining about the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
decisions.82 By the time Kojak debuted in 1976, the dominant
attitude of cops toward law had undergone a total transformation
from the Perry Mason/Dragnet era.
Kojak, played by bald-is-beautiful Telly Savalas, was a hardnosed, “blue-collar, ethnic cop” who “was tougher than his
predecessors, as well as more violent, unyielding, and obsessed
with the way criminals were ‘getting off’ because the police were
not allowed to do their job properly.”83 In stark contrast to
Detective Friday’s stoic and dutiful delivery of the Miranda
warnings to arrestees, Kojak glibly announced to his captives in
a first-season episode: “You guys all know your rights, you don’t
In another episode, a suspect
have to say anything.”84
interrupted his interrogation by asserting that he would like a
lawyer, and Kojak retorted, “Doesn’t everybody?”
The
interrogation continued without a lawyer.85 As Kojak
demonstrates, by 1976, television cop shows had taken a turn
away from the bland, just-the-facts-ma’am style of Dragnet and

80 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 66, at 205 (noting that “[t]he political reaction was
swift and clear,” including passage of legislation in 1968 purporting to repeal the
decision); id. at 214 (“The instrumental fear was that warning suspects of a ‘right to
remain silent’ and then promising a free lawyer to stand between them and the police
would cause the rate of successful interrogations to plummet and the crime rate to soar.”).
81 Buoyed in part by the popular success of Dragnet and the networks’ insatiable
appetite for popular programming, the era of the television police drama dawned with a
vengeance. During the next several years, the networks debuted a number of new police
shows, including popular hits such as The Mod Squad (ABC television broadcast 1968–
73), Adam-12 (NBC television broadcast 1968–75), and Hawaii-Five-0 (CBS television
broadcast 1968–80), and countless more detective shows, from Columbo (NBC television
broadcast 1968) to Baretta (ABC television broadcast 1975–78).
82 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 87.
83 Stark, supra note 55, at 262–63.
84 Kojak: Knockover (CBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 1973).
Following this
truncated Miranda warning, Kojak grabs two suspects for an arrest photo and asks them
to “say cheese.”
85 Stark, supra note 55, at 264.
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stopped doing things “by the book.”86 Not only did Hollywood cool
to Dragnet’s (and Miranda’s) sense of procedural regularity,
Hollywood affirmatively embraced the perspective of the
dissenters in Miranda who predicted not only that Miranda
would return rapists and killers to the streets, but that it would
harm “those who rely on the public authority for protection and
who without it can only engage in violent self-help with guns,
knives and the help of their neighbors similarly inclined.”87
Dirty Harry was the first of several major Hollywood films to
dramatize that prediction.88 In Dirty Harry, Clint Eastwood
starred as Detective Harry Callahan, a rogue cop with blatant
disdain for the law but a “good heart.” Merciless to the bad guys,
Dirty Harry is precisely the kind of cop you want on your side
when the going gets tough. Rich in a symbolism of political and
cultural criticism, the set-up of the movie involves the San
Francisco police department’s failing efforts to catch a serial
killer loose on the streets of San Francisco. The killer has
kidnapped a young girl and has demanded ransom. The Mayor,
somewhat like Neville Chamberlain in 1939, agrees to appease
the killer and pay the ransom. Although Detective Callahan is
scornful, he consents to deliver the ransom money (although
obviously he has no intention of obeying orders). After a vicious
battle that almost costs Callahan his life, Dirty Harry tracks
down and corners the killer in an empty football stadium.
Displaying no mercy, Callahan coldly shoots the fleeing killer in
the leg, and in a haunting and violent scene, demands to know
where the kidnapped girl is. When the killer fails to reply,
Callahan grinds his heel into the killer’s mangled limb,
provoking a desperate cry: “I want a lawyer . . . I have a right to
a lawyer . . . I have rights . . . .” The scene fades to black while
the wounded killer howls like an animal in pain.
The film immediately cuts to Detective Callahan watching
the girl’s dead body being retrieved from a hole, confirming that
his act of torture succeeded in inducing the killer to confess.
Then, in the next scene, Callahan has been called into his boss’s
office and arrives expecting congratulations. Instead, he is
berated for his use of unlawful methods, informed that his search
violated the suspect’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment rights,

86 Id. (“On television, the police of the 1970’s [sic] grew increasingly more
contemptuous of the Constitution.”).
87 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
88 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971). See also Charles Bronson in Death Wish
(Paramount Pictures 1974), described as a “key film in the vigilante cycle,” and a
mutation of “cop movies like Dirty Harry into an uncomfortable lynch mob attitude.” THE
BFI COMPANION TO CRIME (Phil Hardy ed., 1997).
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and told that the evidence is inadmissible in court and that the
killer would go free.89
The interrogation scene in Dirty Harry contrasts vividly, to
say the least, with those in Laura and Dragnet. Not only does
the film openly accuse the law of coddling vicious criminals to the
detriment of public safety, but it seems to challenge the very
premise of police regulation of interrogation. Dirty Harry’s
political message is hardly subtle: the law is the problem, not the
solution, because it creates a wedge between the forces of justice
that need information and the criminals who seeks to conceal it.90
And what is the law? What are the rights that let serial killers
get off the hook for their crimes? Largely, the film suggests,
Miranda, and particularly its promised right to counsel. Dirty
Harry makes Miranda an icon of all that is perverse and
ineffective in the justice system. Dirty Harry’s torture of the
suspect, though portrayed with brutality, is ultimately meant to
seem justifiable as a matter of simple justice, even if not legal in
the eyes of the lawyers. In this manner, Dirty Harry not only
takes on Miranda, it harkens all the way back to Brown v.
Mississippi.91 If law undermines the ability of cops to get
confessions from clearly guilty suspects, does it not also
undermine the possibility of justice?
Like Dragnet, the cop shows of the 1970s told their stories
from the point of view of the police. As the cop shows became
more sophisticated, the characters of the police men and women
they featured gradually grew increasingly textured. But the
criminals of this era, unlike their film noir predecessors,
remained simple caricatures: animals so lost in their lust to do
evil that it rarely mattered what fate befell them—arrest,
shooting, or death by car crash—as long as they were ultimately
tamed and subdued.92 In Dirty Harry’s climactic interrogation
89 In the end, Callahan disobeys a direct order to stay away from the case, saves a
busload of children abducted by the killer, and delivers proper retribution. See
IMDb.com, Plot Summary for Dirty Harry (1971), http://imdb.com/title/tt0066999/
plotsummary (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
90 See William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s Theory of
Revenge, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra note 8, at 161, 174 (noting that films
like Dirty Harry and Death Wish depict Miranda warnings and other legal rules as
symbols of the state’s failure to deliver real justice; that is, they depict the loss of faith in
public institutions).
91 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936) (holding that a confession procured through torture
violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and further, that this
applies to the states).
92 The villain in Dirty Harry was as extreme an example of this as possible, a
“psycho hippie” who “rapes and buries alive a teenager, shoots innocent people at random,
tries to blackmail the whole city and finally terrorises [sic] a busload of children.” THE
BFI COMPANION TO CRIME, supra note 88, at 108. This phenomenon might be explained
in part by an increasing emphasis on the portrayal of cops in contrast to film noir’s focus
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scene, Detective Callahan does not question a person, he breaks
an animal.
Released in 1971, Dirty Harry anticipated the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts’ campaign to scale back Miranda. Numerous
factors undoubtedly contributed to the backlash against
Miranda. Most obviously, conservative judicial appointments
from the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations replaced
liberals who were sympathetic to the Warren Court’s progressive
goals. But it is likely that pop culture’s attack on law’s benign
image, an attack that necessarily undermined the Court’s own
legitimacy, further encouraged the Court’s retreat. After all, the
Justices, lacking both purse and sword, “must rely on public
support for the implementation of their policies.”93 Here, it is
Hollywood that is clearing space for a post-Warren Court
retrenchment by reshaping the iconography, not only of
interrogation, but of law itself. In any event, with only a few
exceptions,94 what followed Dirty Harry was a barrage of
decisions that whittled down the scope and effect of Miranda
and, at the same time, the costs to police of using pressure tactics
to induce confessions. The first, and perhaps the most important,
of these decisions was handed down the same year Dirty Harry
was released. In Harris v. New York, the Court held that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda could be used for
Harris undercut the hope that
impeachment purposes.95
Miranda would provide the foundation for an interrogation-room
code of conduct, and gave police ample incentive to ignore
Miranda when doing so proved convenient. It also set the tone
for the decisions to follow. Three years later, Michigan v. Tucker
introduced the theory of Miranda as a “prophylactic” rule.96 In
1979, North Carolina v. Butler established the critical
clarification (really, partial overruling) of Miranda’s waiver
rules, relieving police of the supposed heavy burden of showing
that a suspect expressly waived his Miranda rights, so long as
the facts and circumstances show that an implicit waiver was
on criminals. But even prominent films that did give villains a high profile, such as THE
SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures Corporation 1991), tended to depict the villains as
grotesqueries, not as normal human beings gone astray. See IMDb.com, Plot Summary
for Silence of the Lambs (1991), http://imdb.com/title/tt0102926/plotsummary (last visited
Feb. 27, 2007).
93 VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 5 (2003).
94 See, for example, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), which illustrated
almost precisely the specter that Dirty Harry dramatized.
95 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
96 417 U.S. 433, 445–46 (1974) (“[T]he police conduct at issue here did not abridge
respondent’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege.”).
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knowing and intelligent.97 Numerous decisions in the 1980s and
1990s only further watered down Miranda’s substantive
protections.98
By the time Dickerson came before the Court, Miranda had
been broken—much like Dirty Harry’s serial killer. As the Court
somewhat euphemistically stated, “[O]ur subsequent cases have
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling . . . .”99
The notion that Miranda would make obsolete the backroom
interrogation, that confessions would be made in the courtroom,
if at all, or for that matter, that suspects needed much legal
protection from their interrogators was long gone.100 Miranda as
legal formalism, however, was more entrenched than ever both in
popular culture and in legal practice. Police departments had
grown accustomed to Miranda, and even began to see its
charm.101 While Miranda—especially in its watered down postDirty Harry incarnation—placed few real constraints on police
interrogation, it shielded interrogation practices from
substantive scrutiny.102 As long as Miranda’s formal warnings
and waiver requirements were met, any confession obtained
thereafter was almost always been treated as voluntary.103

441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1975) (expanding Harris v. New York’s
exception to permit the use of statements obtained after police disregarded the
defendant’s request for counsel for impeachment purposes); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 240–41 (1980) (permitting the use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes);
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (permitting the use of post-arrest silence for
impeachment purposes); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that
Miranda warnings are not required prior to roadside questioning during a routine traffic
stop); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a “public-safety exception” to
Miranda); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations), Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) (holding that a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary
despite failure of the police to inform him that a lawyer was attempting to contact him
during interrogation); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (holding that the police are
not obliged to inform suspect of specific crimes that are subject of interrogation); Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that an undercover police officer is not required to
administer warnings to a suspect interrogated in a jail cell); and Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452 (1994) (holding that ambiguous invocations of Miranda rights may be
ignored).
99 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
100 See Kamisar, supra note 77, at 25 (“[T]he Miranda that had survived the Burger
Court-Rehnquist Court gauntlet . . . was a far cry from what might be called the ‘original
Miranda.’”).
101 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 66, at 252–53 (noting that “for the most part law
enforcement supports Miranda” and pointing out that “none of the major police lobbying
groups . . . joined in then[-]Attorney General Edwin Meese’s call to overrule Miranda” in
the mid-1980s).
102 Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2001).
103 Id.
97
98

761-788 COVEY.DOC

9/18/2007 7:03:21 AM

2007] Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution

785

Perhaps because the post-Miranda crime shows have focused
so heavily on cops, the dramatic function of confession has
assumed an ever more instrumental quality, at least on the cop
shows. Confession undoubtedly did little for the killer’s soul in
Dirty Harry, but it did permit police to find the abducted victim.
This instrumentalism might be seen as a reflection of deeper
societal attitudes toward criminals over the course of a threedecade period that saw the incarceration rate quadruple since
Dirty Harry was released.
By the 1990s, Miranda’s iconization was complete. The
Miranda warnings indeed had become “embedded” in popular
culture. Today, a whole complex of narrative events signifying a
character’s arrest can be concisely depicted by a writer merely
with the image of a police officer taking physical custody of a
suspect and intoning: “You have the right to remain silent . . . .”
At the same time, a new brand of television cop shows such as
Homicide and, in particular, NYPD Blue, have constructed their
basic narrative formulas around the suspect’s interrogation. As
such, the suspect’s decision to forgo his or her right to counsel
and to talk to police has taken a central place in the storyline.104
For better or worse, the reading of Miranda warnings is no
longer the mere formalism it was on Dragnet. Indeed, because
the narrative in these shows is driven by the unfolding
interrogation, and the dramatic catharsis almost invariably
arrives in the form of the suspect’s confession, the Miranda
rights serve, alongside the suspect’s own mental and
psychological prowess, as the foil that creates the story’s
dramatic tension.
Thus over the course of nearly 70 years, the imagery of
interrogation seems to have traveled a circle in four curvilinear
steps. In the pre-Miranda period of the 1930s and 1940s, police
use of interrogation room pressure was normal and expected.
The 1950s and 1960s witnessed an accelerating rejection of
pressure tactics by the Supreme Court and an era of popular
culture which increasingly, albeit briefly, held up lawyers as
heroes and law as a force of both truth (Perry Mason) and order
(Dragnet). These developments laid the foundation for the classic
“Miranda era,” which was characterized by a popular, albeit
temporary, inversion of the traditional demonization of the
criminal and glorification of the cop, a corresponding celebration
of formal law and of criminal defense lawyers in particular, and
which saw the mass public dissemination of the warnings on
104 See Bandes & Beermann, supra note 13, at 8 (1998) (noting that “[t]he unifying
principle in [NYPD Blue] interrogations is the need to convince suspects not to consult a
lawyer”).
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shows like Dragnet and Adam-12. Beginning with President
Nixon’s election in 1968, however, the Miranda era gave way to a
post-Miranda period characterized by an increasing backlash
against the Warren Court agenda. In the post-Miranda world,
Miranda was targeted by critics and reactionaries and became an
icon of the law’s perceived tenderness toward criminals. And at
the same time that Miranda became an object of derision in the
crime dramas of the 1970s and 1980s, it was slowly but steadily
gutted by the Supreme Court in a long series of decisions that
sought to make compliance with the Miranda rules simple and to
minimize the consequences of noncompliance.
By 1999, Miranda had been neutered as an instrument of
progressive legal regulation even while it had become the symbol
of constitutional rights in the popular imagination. Viewed from
this vantage point, the Court’s decision in Dickerson was a fait
accompli. Having cut Miranda down to manageable size, a
conservative Court had nothing left to gain by formally
overruling Miranda. But it stood to lose an inestimable amount
of popular esteem should it purport to withdraw from the
citizenry the most familiar set of legal rights known to them. It
perhaps even risked losing “the Nation’s confidence in the judge
as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”105
Meanwhile, contemporary cop shows have subtly altered
Miranda by making it part and parcel of the drama of
interrogation. If Miranda is no longer vilified as the enemy of
the beat cop, neither is it his friend.106 Still, it remains as
ineffective a safeguard for preventing confessions as ever. In
retrospect, this process, too, seems to have been inevitable.
Miranda’s purpose—the regulation of custodial interrogation—
strikes such a sensitive narrative nerve that its neutralization
was a dramatic imperative. To comply with the demands of
verisimilitude, screenwriters had no choice but to incorporate
Miranda into the dramatic representation of the interrogation
moment. At the same time, the overarching narrative demands
of the format continued to require confessions. As a result,
although Miranda has been widely publicized in pop culture, it
has been portrayed in a manner that underscores its impotence;
in popular culture, Miranda warnings or no, the suspect always
confesses.
Finally, although Miranda’s post-Dragnet decline can be
understood partly as the work of an increasingly conservative
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Bandes & Beermann, supra note 13, at 7 (noting the willingness of NYPD Blue
characters to ignore the Constitution when it is necessary to get the bad guys).
105
106
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Court, a response to a continuing explosion in the crime rate, and
a pervasive cultural cynicism fueled by Vietnam and Watergate,
it also must be understood in part as an almost inevitable
aesthetic development. After all, films and television shows are
first and foremost entertainment vehicles; their function is to
titillate and amuse, all with the intent of maximizing viewership
from the right demographic and, a fortiori, network and studio
revenue.
Given the aesthetic demands of popular drama,
Dragnet-style rectitude inevitably had to give way to something
more interesting. As one writer in the 1970s complained, “Our
whole show has to come to a dead stop every week while the cop
politely reads the crook his rights.”107 And as another added,
“This civil rights business may be all right in real life but it
makes miserable drama.”108
CONCLUSION
The Dirty Harry-style paranoia eventually faded, but it left
in its wake a pop culture version of Miranda in which the
warnings have become an icon representing the whole awkward
apparatus of courts, law, and constitutional regulation of
criminal justice. To many, these rights undoubtedly “stand for”
the very idea of constitutional law.
Because the Miranda warnings—routine or reviled—have
become synonymous with constitutional law—and thus with the
Supreme Court itself—it is no surprise that the Court declined to
eradicate them in Dickerson. Doing so would have amounted to
eradication of law itself in the eyes of popular culture. The
Court’s institutional interest in preserving its own popular
status, and in protecting a legal regime that, thanks to the
media, looks like it bends over backward for defendants, while in
reality (as a result of a sustained judicial attack on its
fundamental functions) provides defendants very little legal
protection, allows a conservative Court to have its cake and eat
it, too.
In sum, just as the media necessarily creates and depends
upon signs, symbols, and icons, and manipulates them to serve
its basic purposes—to tell its stories effectively and efficiently, to
keep viewers engaged, and to keep sponsors happy—in narrating
and explicating legal decisions, courts do precisely the same
107 Stark, supra note 55, at 261 (quoting Gunther, TV Police Dramas are Teaching
Civil Rights to a Generation of Viewers, TV GUIDE, Dec. 18, 1971, at 9). Perhaps the
underlying sentiment of Dickerson is just the opposite, that this civil rights business may
make good drama, but it is pretty miserable in real life.
108 Id. (quoting Gunther, TV Police Dramas are Teaching Civil Rights to a Generation
of Viewers, TV GUIDE, Dec. 18, 1971, at 9).
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thing, with their own institutional interests dictating the manner
in which those signs will be treated. Certainly, the semiotics of
interrogation, followed over time, elucidates important changes
in popular and legal assumptions about a variety of aspects of
criminal justice, including the identity of criminals, the causes of
criminality, the purposes of interrogation, and the proper role of
interrogators. The fact that popular and legal iconography has
moved along the same trajectory suggests not only that popular
culture draws its source material from the courts, but also that
the courts narrate, and perhaps resolve, legal problems based in
no small part on iconographic assumptions drawn from popular
culture and the media as well.

